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THE COLOR OF MONEY
PAUL F. CAMPOS*
I begin with two quotations that touch on matters of personal
identity. In Gilbert and Sullivan's H.M.S. Pinafore, the Boat-
swain praises Ralph the able Seaman with the following song:
He is an Englishman!
For he himself has said it,
And it's greatly to his credit,
That he is an Englishman!
For he might have been a Roosian,
A French, or Turk, or Proosian,
Or perhaps Italian!
But in spite of all temptations
To belong to other nations,
He remains an Englishman!1
This is supposed to strike the audience as absurd: Ralph can
hardly be praised for resisting the temptation to be what he
cannot be in order to remain what he surely is-an Englishman.
Today, when we have come to accept that so much of reality is
socially constructed rather than being a reflection of some
objectively immutable order of things, there is no longer anything
absurd about the idea of choosing to remain a member of one
nationality rather than becoming something (or someone) else.
Indeed, it seems that various markers of personal identity
become more transitory and permeable all the time; and thus in
contemporary American culture it is now widely accepted that
persons can alter not just their nationality but their class status,
their religion, their sexual orientation, and even their gender.
Interestingly, one social marker seems relatively immune
from this protean flux: race. In this culture, O.J. Simpson's
blackness is understood to be just as much a brute fact about him
as the fact that he has two arms and two legs. In America at the
end of the twentieth century, the idea that Simpson can choose to
remain black remains as ridiculous as the idea that Ralph could
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. THE COMPLETE PLAYS OF GILBERT AND SULLIVAN 112 (1941).
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choose to remain English seemed to his fellow countrymen 120
years ago.
The second quote comes from the former heavyweight boxing
champion Larry Holmes. In response to a white reporter's
questions about growing up black in the working-class town of
Easton, Pennsylvania, Holmes made the following observation:
"It's hard being black. You ever been black? I was black
orice-when I was poor. '
This cryptic statement concerning the complex interplay
between the concepts of race and class in American society might
serve as an epigram for the O.J. Simpson trial. Indeed, Holmes's
observation reminds us that O.J. Simpson was in a unique
position to exploit that interplay. Simpson is certainly "black" in
Holmes's sense in that his racial identity made possible the sorts
of arguments that his defense was able to exploit so well
-arguments about the racist proclivities of the likes of Mark
Fuhrman. But Simpson is also "white"-again in Holmes's
sense-in that he could actually afford to pay for such an
elaborate exploitation of those arguments. By successfully
synthesizing these aspects of Simpson's identity, his defense was
able to produce what even in victim-obsessed America remains a
true cultural rarity: the oppressed millionaire.
But this reminds us that all the handwringing over race in
the Simpson affair only helped to obscure the much more salient
question of social class. Can there be much question that if
Simpson had been poor or working class, then, black or white, the
overwhelming circumstantial case against him would have led his
public defender to convince him of the wisdom of pleading out to
second-degree murder? That if, in the unlikely event there had
been a trial, it would have taken no more than perhaps two
weeks? That the outcome of such a trial would never really have
been in doubt? These are not, of course, original observations.
All through the trial we heard again and again from a host of
legal commentators how only the circumstance of Simpson's
wealth made it possible for him to take full advantage of the
many generous features that the American legal system makes
available to those criminal defendants who can afford them. This,
we were led to understand, was a shame. So in a sense, the class
2. Lynn Darling, Larry Holmes: Undefeated, Undefined and Undeniable, WASH.
POST, Apr. 24, 1983, at D1.
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angle was not ignored during the Simpson trial. Yet, these very
same commentators seemed to believe it was simply a regrettable
(and immutable) feature of social reality that only rich defendants
had the resources to exploit fully the complex structure of
contemporary American criminal jurisprudence.
What was most curious about this attitude was its orienta-
tion toward the very problem it identified. Imagine if Simpson
were to receive the sort of defense that could have been put up by
an earnest public defender. Then, after the inevitable conviction,
the American public is informed that unfortunately only white
people are allowed the sort of defense that might have spared the
former football star. Such a claim would, of course, be utterly
unacceptable. Yet when faced with the disturbing fact that,
despite the egalitarian rhetoric of our legal system, only rich
people can afford much of what is referred to as "the rule of law,"
the reaction of the legal establishment is akin to the fatalistic
resignation of a Dostoyevskian peasant confronting the onset of
another Russian winter. 'You shouldn't blame us for this state of
affairs," explain various apologists for the legal status quo.
"That's just the price we pay for having the rule of law. Justice,
after all, isn't cheap." This is then followed by utterly utopian
statements to the effect that the government "should" make "high
quality" (a.k.a. expensive) legal services available to all the
public-statements that in order to be actualized would necessi-
tate the sort of wealth redistribution that would in turn require
the elite legal establishment to surrender some of its economic
and social privilege, which of course it isn't going to do.
Am I being unfair? Sure-but not that unfair. Let us
imagine a certain figure: we'll call him a typical liberal legal
academic, or "ATLLA" for short. ATLLA believes in what he
thinks of as the rule of law. Now this thing he believes in, and
which indeed he dedicates much of his professional life defending,
isn't, of course, anything nearly as capacious as what it sounds
like. For in a literal sense the rule of law must include how they
do things in other countries, countries about whose legal systems
ATLLA admittedly doesn't know much. For ATLLA, the rule of
law is in all likelihood really the rule of Harvard law, which is to
say of the legal process 'urisprudence that has been handed down
to a generation of legal academics during their student days in
1996]
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Cambridge, Massachusetts, or some very similar sort of place.'
I once produced a catechismic imitation of the legal process style
that I think captures both the ideological commitments underly-
ing its methods, and the consequences for thought and prose that
tend to follow from faithful attempts to carry out the method's
rigorous requirements. Here is a representative sample:
What judicial procedures do these methods involve?
They involve, firstly, a careful not to say exhaustive
review of all the relevant legal materials whose meaning,
properly interpreted, might throw light on the proper resolu-
tion of the sorts of cases and controversies that courts display
a special institutional competence toward resolving; secondly,
the formulation of various complex interlocking directives by
means of which the properly interpreted meaning of those
materials may be made synonymous with those interpretations
that flow from the proper deployment of those interpretive
methods which give the meaning of those materials a public
and formal character, thereby making that meaning accessible
to everyone who has undergone a socialization process resem-
bling that to which students at elite American law schools
were subjected, circa 1958; thirdly, the acceptance of the
pragmatic yet principled dictum that law is a purposive
activity which continually strives to solve the basic problems
of social living; fourthly, the full recognition of the indispens-
able role played by that most lawyerly virtue, procedure, in
assuring a kind of objectivity to what would otherwise degener-
ate into an unconstrained act of judicial fiat; fifthly, the
establishment of the principle or public norm that decisions
which are duly arrived at as a result of duly established
procedures for making decisions of this kind ought to be
accepted as binding on the whole society unless and until they
are duly changed; and sixthly, the sobering realization that
the only alternative to regularized and peaceable methods of
decision is a disintegrating resort to violence."
This is a parody, but not a very gross one: in fact, several
phrases in the passage were lifted whole from the locus classicus
of the movement, Harvard Law professors Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks's eternally unfinished "The Legal Process."5 Legal process
3. See Paul F. Campos, A Heterodox Catechism, in PAUL F. CAMPOS, PIERRE
SCHLAG & STEVEN D. SMITH, AGAINST THE LAw (forthcoming Nov. 1996).
4. Id. at 14 (manuscript on file with author).
5. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Tentative ed. 1958).
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pedagogy, and even more so the ideology from which the teaching
method springs, require an exhaustive engagement with the
materials and procedures of the legal system that in certain
circumstances can rise to the level of a repetition compulsion. (To
be clear: it isn't that careful review of legal questions is a bad
thing. But then neither is washing your hands-unless you feel
compelled to do it forty-seven times per day.) The emphasis on
"getting it right," and the agonized struggle to define just what
that might entail, produce a distinctive vision of law that is
totalizing, relentless, and mostly oblivious to such crass consider-
ations as time, money, and the possible limits of the human
rational inquiry. Nevertheless, as a matter of what can best be
understood as a highly contingent quirk of social and intellectual
history, the formal characteristics of this jurisprudence have
combined with the political orientation of the Warren and Burger
Courts to produce what ATLLA now thinks of as the rule of law.6
It has been little noted that one of the many fascinating
aspects of the Simpson trial was how it provided an unusual
opportunity to see a relatively pure example of this rule of law in
action. After all, given the economic consequences of taking what
is called the rule of law seriously, it isn't surprising that fully
ninety percent of all criminal convictions in this country take
place without a trial, and that an even higher percentage of civil
litigation is settled without the benefit of a courtroom verdict.
Those trials that do take place are themselves almost always
much more cursory than what rule of law ideology would consider
consonant with an adequate exploration of the relevant legal
materials. But Americans are by reputation practical people; and
most of the time we find it is simply too expensive to enjoy the full
benefits of the rule of Harvard law.
The Simpson trial was different. Because of the political
importance of the case to the Los Angeles District Attorney's
Office, and because of the almost unprecedented economic and
social position of the defendant (with the doubtful exception of
Aaron Burr, Simpson was the most celebrated American ever to
be charged with murder), there was essentially no economic
barrier to transforming the rule of law from classroom theory into
courtroom practice. Here was a rare occasion where consider-
6. An excellent example of this ideology, expressed in popular rather than
academic terms, is ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982). Dershowitz, of
course, was one of O.J. Simpson's attorneys.
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ations of scarcity did not rein in the enthusiasm of the partici-
pants, thereby allowing the platoons of lawyers and "experts"
deployed by both the prosecution and the defense to exploit the
full panoply of options made available to them by the structure of
our criminal justice system. Dozens of witnesses were questioned
and cross-examined for days at a stretch; evidentiary rulings,
interpleadings, and motions of every conceivable sort took up
hundreds of hours; the impanelling of the jury and the intermit-
tent expulsion of nearly half of its original members alone took up
far more time than was spent on, for instance, the debate and
ratification of the original United States Constitution.
None of this, of course, seemed to make much of an impres-
sion on the surviving jurors, who disposed of the issue at hand
with a brisk indifference to the facts that itself suggested the
futility of the whole absurd exercise, and which indeed brought to
mind the relative advantages of trial by ordeal. In the days since
that surreal climax it has often been said-it has already been
said at this Symposium-that recommendations for reform should
not be based on the Simpson trial, which, it must be remembered,
was in some ways a unique event.7 Such statements are of course
accurate as far as they go, but consider what they overlook. For
what was most unique about the Simpson trial was precisely that
it provided an example, in the practice of an actual courtroom
rather than in the theory of the law school classroom, of contempo-
rary American rule of law ideology in full bloom. Here, in the
scarcity-free space of Judge Ito's court, we saw the consequences
of actually operationalizing this rule of law. Here we saw in their
most extreme form those characteristic features of the American
legal system that my colleague Bill Pizzi recently identified as
"the worship of proceduralism, the attempt to rationalize every
aspect of the decision-making process, the distrust of spontaneous
action, the heavy preference for managerial control over partici-
pants, and, above all, the daunting complexity of the rules that
such a system requires."8 It is of course hyperbole, but is there
not also some truth in the claim that this, after all, is how the
American criminal justice system is supposed to work? Indeed,
we might want to think of the Simpson trial as a year-long
7. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, The Simpson Affair, Reform of the Criminal Justice
Process, and Magic Bullets, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 989,993-94 (1996)
8. William T. Pizzi, Soccer, Football and Trial Systems, 1 COLUM. J. EuRo. LAW
369, 377 (1995).
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demonstration of the ways in which much of what is called the
rule of law resembles, in its most florid manifestations, a
culturally valorized form of obsessive-compulsive behavior.9
Perhaps, then, the question on which the professional
defenders of the legal status quo need to focus more attention is
the following: Just whose interests are served by this social
structure and by the behavior that it elicits? Who benefits from
the immense and even neurotic complexity of the modern
American legal system? We already know the answer to this
question-indeed, our friend ATLLA knows the answer. That is
why he "supports" increased funding for legal aid; that is, in part,
why sometimes he will even represent a death row inmate for
freeL-pro bono publico, "for the public good." That is a noble-
sounding phrase, but let me suggest a scheme that might benefit
the wretched refuse of our teeming shores in a more meaningful
way. It isn't going to happen, of course-almost nothing recom-
mended by well-intentioned academics ever happens.' Still,
imagine a system of criminal trials in which juries were seated by
picking the first twelve people in the pool who were not related to
the defendant or the victims. Imagine a system in which wit-
nesses could say what they had to say in their own words, without
constant interruptions for evidentiary rulings by control-obsessed
advocates and decision makers. Imagine a system where these
advocates played a relatively minor, facilitating role in the
proceedings. Imagine a system in which, because of such
features, it was simply expected as a matter of course that most
trials would take a day or two, with the occasional proceeding
lasting as long as a week. Finally, picture a system of criminal
justice where mixed panels of legal professionals and laypersons
would work together to decide the fate of the defendant. Now
despite their exotic flavor, these suggestions are not mere pipe
dreams. Something like this is in fact what the criminal justice
systems of many other countries already resemble. 2
What social consequences would flow from such a system?
Note that in such a system a middle-class person would be able
9. See Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178 (1996).
10. For a classic rationalization of this mindset, see DERSHOWITZ, supra note 6.
11. See Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, in CAMPOS, SCHLAG
& SMITH, supra note 3.
12. See John H. Langbein, Mixed Court and Jury Court: Could the Continental
Alternative Fill the American Need?, 1981 AM. B. FoUND. REs. J. 195.
1996]
928 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
to afford a defense to a serious criminal charge that would in
most respects be comparable to what a rich person could procure.
Furthermore, a system along these lines would give the poor
criminal defendant a realistic chance of having his true legal
expenses defrayed by the government or absorbed by a lawyer
who, under such circumstances, would not need to make a huge
economic sacrifice in order to represent an impoverished defen-
dant. Such speculations remind us of how the Will to Pro-
cess-the urge to rationalize, codify, administrate, proceduralize,
and otherwise complicate a system of social coordination and
dispute processing-increasingly makes that system available
only to the social elites who have the resources to manipulate it.
They also remind us that academic visions of what law is have
political consequences, although rarely in the way law professors
imagine. What matters about what legal academics teach their
students is not the substance but the form; or rather in this case
the form is the substance of what students learn. For instance,
ATLLA believes that in his criminal law classroom he is demon-
strating that the death penalty is unconstitutional, when what he
is really demonstrating is how to produce a system that will not
only execute a poor man, but will also spend $2,000,000 trying to
determine whether he was represented adequately by a court-
appointed drunkard who was paid $500 for his trouble. Justice,
we are told, isn't cheap. Indeed it isn't: especially when, despite
the egalitarian rhetoric within which they are routinely cloaked,
the excesses of American legal ideology tend to transform the rule
of law into a kind of luxury good.
We may be sure that the defenders of the rule of law will find
themselves horrified by any suggestion that the legal system
should grant its subjects fewer rights and options, that it should
be less rationalist and more open to the role of chance in human
decision making, or that it should give up on any ambitions to
achieve a high degree of what we call "justice." ("I fear those big
words which make us so unhappy," says Stephen Daedelus in
Ulysses.)"3 But how can such a system ensure the undeniable
benefits of what is called "procedural due process"? How will it
weed out prejudicial evidence and jury bias? How, in a word, will
it be fair? But the question the defenders of the status quo need
to face-that we need to face-is "fair" in comparison to what? In
13. JAMES JOYCE, ULYSSES 32 (1942).
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comparison to a system that has, partially through the efforts of
ATLLA and his legion of academic fellow travelers, become so
elaborate, so complicated, so unwieldy, and therefore so expensive
that it is in most respects fully operationalized only for the
benefit of the upper class?
"The rich," noted F. Scott Fitzgerald, "are not like you and
me." 'Yes," replied his friend Ernest Hemingway, "they have
money." In America today, what is celebrated in legal academic
circles as the rule of law often functions as a complex cultural
mechanism for the protection of class privilege. And, ironically,
it is by their very efforts to make law "fair"-efforts that per-
versely make the benefits of law ever more dependent upon the
expertise of a specialized sector of the upper class-that the
members of this same sector of the upper class have made many
of the benefits of law all but unavailable to anyone other than
members of the class to which they themselves belong. Yet the
blindness that so many contemporary American lawyers display
toward how legal ideology plays an important role in the creation
and maintenance of the same class structure from which those
lawyers benefit is hardly a new or unique phenomenon. To
paraphrase words written by Anatole France more than a century
ago,14 the law in its majestic equality declares that the poor as
well as the rich have the "right" to the full analytic rigor of
procedural due process, to the endless elaboration of evidentiary
standards of review, to the exhaustive deployment of the appel-
late court system, and to the most socially irresponsible represen-
tation money can buy.
14. "[In their] majestic equality ... the laws ... forbid rich and poor alike to
sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread." ANATOLE
FRANCE, THE RED LILY 80 (Book League of Am. 1937) (1894).
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